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Abstract 
Urban expansion in the early twentieth century had a profound impact on India’s urban land 
economies. Historians argue that in this period, urban India went through an increasing 
marketization of land and that improvement trusts had a significant hand in accelerating land 
speculation. In the case of Bombay, we still understand little of the relationship between the 
activities of the Bombay Improvement Trust and rising land values. The paper examines key 
legal disputes around compensation for land acquired by the Trust for public purpose before 
and after the First World War. Such cases show how the Trust and the judiciary shaped 
changing expectations around what comprised ‘market value’ and consequently became 
deeply involved in Bombay’s land economy. Where officials had earlier resisted valuations 
that they believed encouraged speculation, after the 1920s the resolution of disputes 




On 30 January 1905, the Special Collector of the City of Bombay Improvement Trust 
awarded Merwanji Muncherji Cama and his brother Hormusji the amount of just over five 
lakh rupees (Rs 512,105).1 The award was for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894 for a goods depot in the neighbourhood of Chinchpooghly, Byculla, for the Great 
Indian Peninsular Railway. The amount was to compensate the ‘market value’ of land, in this 
case, four plots totalling 85,799 square yards. At well over eight lakh rupees (Rs 837,780), 
the Cama brothers’ surveyors differed considerably from the collector in their valuation. 
Their calculations employed a method which took into account the potential value of the 
land, if developed with buildings. In contrast, the collector had calculated an amount based 
on the rent it could raise in its current condition. In March, after a tribunal confirmed the 
original award, the brothers declared it to be ‘opposed to the received rules of law, equity and 
good conscience’ and appealed to the Bombay High Court.2  
The Cama brothers’ case opens a window onto Bombay’s rapidly expanding land 
economy in the early twentieth century. With increasing numbers of individuals investing in 
land and large swathes being acquired for development, disputes abounded as to how its 
value should be calculated. The officers of the Trust and the judges of the High Court resisted 
calculations based on projections of what land might be worth in the future, arguing that it 
encouraged speculation. Yet by the 1920s, their valuations reflected the speculative logic of 
the market.  
This article examines this shift towards speculative valuation. It explores land 
valuation in an important moment of Bombay’s expansion. Cities in colonial India witnessed 
a period of rapid growth in the early twentieth century as rural populations migrated to work 
in new industries. Improvement trusts were established in several cities to manage the task of 
urban development, Bombay’s being the first in 1898. Trusts acquired land through the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894 to build roads, housing for the working classes and transport systems 
to settle suburbs. Industrialization and urban growth had a significant impact on India’s urban 
land economies. In Bombay, land values rose, prompting spiralling rents and speculation. 
Historians argue that in this period, urban India went through an increasing marketization of 
                                                            
1 Maharashtra State Archives (MSA), Legal Department, Suits, Bombay B-1/1 1907-10, compilation no 116 of 
1907, Reference in the Matter of Merwanji Muncherji Cama and another vs. The Government of Bombay; 9 
Bombay Law Reporter (henceforth Bom LR) 1232 (1907), In re: Land Acquisition Act, 1894, In re: 
Government of Bombay and Merwanji Muncherji Cama.  
2 ‘Land acquisition, railway goods depot’, Times of India, 28 Nov. 1906. 
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land. Prashant Kidambi, among others, argues that the Bombay Improvement Trust had a 
significant hand in accelerating speculation in urban land.3 That land speculation 
accompanies urban expansion is part of liberal economic common sense – we take for 
granted the relationship between urban growth and speculation.4 However, we still 
understand little of what this relationship looked like in modern South Asia.   
There is a growing literature on speculation in the South Asian context. We know that 
speculative practices have a long history in India. Ritu Birla has explored a range of such 
practices from rain gambling to betting on commodities such as jute, opium and silver in 
western, northern and eastern India. She argues that ‘market governance’ sought to tame the 
rather wild – and illegitimate – element of chance in the gamble, with legal devices that, by 
the early twentieth century, had separated gambling from speculation.5 The history of 
speculation in urban land, however, is understudied, with a few recent exceptions. Debjani 
Bhattacharyya, for instance, shows in her study of Calcutta how, around the 1920s, debates in 
official circles separated the ‘economicity of speculation’ in land from the ‘criminality of rent 
profiteering’, with the former central to a forward-looking economy.6 Similarly, Anish 
Vanaik’s study of Delhi in the early twentieth century demonstrates the significance of the 
colonial state’s interventions and the interests of business houses in shaping the city’s land 
markets through the 1930s and 1940s.7 In its examination of the forces shaping land markets 
in colonial India, this scholarship challenges the inevitability of the relationship between 
urbanisation and speculation and deepens our understanding of how capitalism develops in 
specific contexts. 
This article examines the role of the Trust in land speculation in early twentieth-
century Bombay. In particular, it looks at key legal disputes around land valuation before and 
after the First World War. Cases of valuation and compensation are important in 
understanding this moment in Bombay’s urban history as they shine a light on the way that 
                                                            
3 P. Kidambi, The making of an Indian metropolis: colonial governance and public culture in Bombay, 1890-
1920 (Aldershot, Hants, 2007). 
4 A. Haila, Urban land rent: Singapore as a property state (Oxford, 2016).  
5 R. Birla, Stages of capital: law, culture and market governance in late colonial India (Durham NC, 2009), 
chapter 4.   
6 D. Bhattacharyya, ‘Interwar housing speculation and rent profiteering in colonial Calcutta’, Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (CSSAAME), 36 (2016), 465-82 at 480. 
7 A. Vanaik, Possessing the city: property and politics in Delhi, 1911-1947 (Oxford, 2019). 
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the Trust sought to manage challenges around compensation. As judgements in such disputes 
make clear, there was no objective value in land that officers of the Trust could establish. 
Indeed, the article argues that far from being neutral bodies seeking to determine an accurate 
value to the land, the Trust and the judiciary were important actors in shaping ideas about 
what the proper methods of land valuation were and thus, the land market itself. Rulings on 
disputes in the 1920s marked a shift away from the earlier resistance to speculative valuation 
to a point where future value was incorporated as a legitimate, even necessary, part of the 
economy. The article begins with a background to Bombay’s land economy and the work of 
the Trust before going into a discussion of the Land Acquisition Act and its definition of 
market value. It then explores a series of cases in the Bombay High Court around methods of 
valuation from 1905 to 1926.  
 
Urban land in Bombay before the Trust 
Bombay is a city that came into being in the period of British rule. The East India Company 
took over the islands of Bombay from Charles II in 1661.8 It established its base in the 
southern tip which it fortified, an area still called ‘Fort’, encouraging migration and 
settlement in its attempt to turn Bombay into a centre of trade and enterprise. By the late 
eighteenth century, its settled population had grown to about 100,000.9 Bombay had 
numerous tenurial systems dating back to early medieval Hindu dynasties, which made it 
difficult to determine accurately what revenue had to be paid to the government. Land 
revenue surveys sought to clarify the complex of rights and entitlements and transform 
certain forms of tenure into freehold plots.10 An Act of 1839 recognized ‘private interests’ in 
land, marking the beginning of efforts to systematize land administration and the transfer and 
exchange of properties. Officials sought to acquire land for the development of the city, in 
particular for the railways, from what had now become private owners.11  
Bombay’s economy grew rapidly through the nineteenth century and it replaced Surat 
as the primary commercial hub in western India. The cotton and opium trade attracted 
                                                            
8 M. Dossal, Theatre of conflict, city of hope: Mumbai 1600 to present times (New Delhi, 2010), 4-13. 
9 Ibid., 34-6. 
10 Ibid., 42-4, 72 passim.  
11 Ibid., 108. On land acquisition in the early colonial state, see D. Bhattacharyya, ‘History of eminent domain in 
colonial thought and legal practice’, Economic and Political Weekly, 50 (2015), 45-53. 
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merchants, largely from the Hindu and Muslim Gujarati trading castes, as well as Parsis.12 
The Great Indian Peninsular Railway and Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway 
companies began operations in the 1850s, opening up the cotton growing districts in the 
Deccan. The first cotton mills were opened in 1854 and drew large numbers of migrant 
labourers from the surrounding countryside.13 The cotton boom of the 1860s spurred 
industrial growth and commodity speculation. Land reclamation was also underway by the 
1860s under the auspices of the new Government of India. Vast tracts of land were reclaimed 
from the western and eastern foreshores, managed by companies which made enormous 
profits in the period of economic expansion.14 
The city was transformed through the nineteenth century as new land was created. In 
the late nineteenth century, the government began efforts to convert Bombay’s ‘complex 
system of tenures into straightforward and saleable plots’, a process that Mariam Dossal 
argues ‘made possible the transition from a nascent to a full-fledged capitalist land market’.15 
The development of the commercial district and the Port Trust drew more migrants to the 
city, increasing the demand for housing. Land prices rose, and, as Sandip Hazareesingh 
argues, ‘investment in urban real estate provided lucrative new opportunities’ for those who 
had made their fortunes in cotton and opium.16 Indeed, as Chandavarkar notes, anyone who 
could, invested in land during this period.17  The new landlords built commercial properties 
and private chawls which were often cheaply constructed, cramped and lacking drainage and 
sewage connections. Mill owners and merchants built new mills and chawls in Byculla, Parel, 
Tardeo and Worli in the north of the city, and the greatest number of new migrants settled 
here. By the turn of the twentieth century, Bombay was increasingly an industrial city marked 
by ‘environmental degradation, human poverty and health pandemics’.18 The outbreak of the 
                                                            
12 C. Dobbin, Urban leadership in Western India: politics and communities in Bombay City, 1840-1885 
(Oxford, 1972), chapter 1. 
13 R. Chandavarkar, The origins of industrial capitalism in India: business strategies and the working classes in 
Bombay 1900-1940 (Cambridge, 1994), chapter 4. 
14 M. Dossal, Imperial designs and Indian realities: the planning of Bombay City, 1845-1875 (Delhi, 1991), 
chapter 6.  
15 Dossal, Theatre of Conflict, 133. 
16 S. Hazareesingh, The colonial city and the challenge of modernity: urban hegemonies and civic contestations 
in Bombay City, 1900-19251925 (Hyderabad, 2007), 16. 
17 Chandavarkar, Origins, 175-7. 
18 Hazareesingh, Colonial City, 23-5. 
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bubonic plague and growing awareness of this urban crisis was the context for the creation of 
the Improvement Trust in 1898. 
 
The Bombay Improvement Trust 
The plague caused widespread disruption in the city, claiming over 100,000 lives, almost 14 
per cent of the city’s population.19 Many others fled for their villages in the surrounding 
countryside. The poorer sections of the city – the old town and the mill areas – suffered most. 
Officials believed that the plague was spread through crowded, squalid conditions. Thus, the 
Trust was established to proffer solutions to what was seen as the problem of urban 
overcrowding. It was given the task of ‘improving’ the city – by creating new roads and 
neighbourhoods, clearing slums and providing housing for the working classes. It was to 
drain swamps, reclaim land from the sea and create new areas for the wealthy classes, as well 
as prepare for the city’s expansion north. It did so through a series of planned ‘schemes’: the 
first sought to create a neighbourhood with tenement housing and sanitary facilities in one of 
the poorest and most congested areas, Nagpada. The next two were road building schemes 
that opened out a path from the business district in the Fort to make an easy commute for the 
richer classes who had moved west to Malabar Hill and its surrounding areas.20  
The Trust was given land owned by the government of Bombay and the city’s 
municipal corporation with the idea that it could be developed and leased out. The 
government had also transferred reclamation rights in some parts of the western coast of 
Bombay to the Trust with the same idea.21 It was within the Trust’s jurisdiction to acquire 
privately-owned land ‘for public purpose’. The schemes all involved the acquisition of land 
from people with varying entitlements to it. While the earlier schemes reshaped the city that 
already existed, the later schemes sought to bring new land into being, from which were 
created the new suburbs to the north – Dadar, Matunga and Worli – as well as the exclusive 
                                                            
19 S.M. Edwardes, Census of India 1901, Bombay (Town and Islands), parts IV, V and VI, vols. 10 and 11 
(Bombay, 1901). 
20 On the Bombay Improvement Trust, see Kidambi, Indian Metropolis, chapter 4; Hazareesingh, Colonial City, 
chapter 1; Dossal, Theatre of Conflict, chapter 7. 
21 Kidambi, Indian Metropolis, 74-5. In Bombay city the government of Bombay acquired land on behalf of the 
Improvement Trust: see F. G. Hartnell Anderson, Manual of land acquisition for the Presidency of Bombay 
(Bombay, 1918), India Office Records (IOR), British Library, (BL), 1. 
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enclaves of Cuffe Parade and Colaba to the south.22 In a short span of time, the Trust 
acquired enormous amounts of land. By 1915, its estates accounted for 10 per cent of all 
urban land and, by 1925, 20 per cent, making it the single largest landowner in the city. The 
land it acquired would be laid out into plots to be leased normally for 99 or 999 years, in line 
with the practice around real property in Britain.23 Similar trusts were established in other 
cities in the early twentieth century, notably Calcutta (1911), Hyderabad (1912) and later 
Delhi (1937).24  
Historians note rising rents and land values during this period and suggest a close 
relationship between these and the activities of the trusts. Prashant Kidambi and Sandip 
Hazareesingh have argued that in Bombay, the Trust increased competition for land which 
fuelled speculation.25 In Calcutta, Debjani Bhattacharyya notes that in the practice of land 
acquisition, the Calcutta Improvement Trust ‘effectively fashioned itself as a land developer 
in the city’.26 Despite these insights, we still have little understanding of the forces that 
shaped land values and speculation in urban South Asia. In Bombay, the special officer 
would determine the compensation to be awarded to the tenants or owners. Landholders were 
entitled to challenge the award, which many did, and disputes turned on the methods by 
which those amounts had been reached.27 Acquisition officers emphasized that land had an 
intrinsic value. Yet, determining what that was often proved complicated and contentious.28 It 
                                                            
22 On schemes to develop Dadar and Matunga, see N. Rao, House, but no garden: apartment living in Bombay’s 
suburbs, 1898-1964 (Minneapolis MN, 2013). On the Cuffe Parade, Backbay and Colaba reclamation projects, 
see G. Prakash, Mumbai fables (Princeton, 2010), chapter 3. 
23 C.A. Webb and N.A. Webb, Valuation of real property: a guide to the principles of valuation of land and 
buildings, etc. for various purposes (London, 1937). 
24 E. L. Beverley, ‘Urbanist expansions: planner-technocrats, patrimonial ethics and state development in 
Hyderabad’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies (henceforth South Asia), 36 (2013), 375-96; 
Bhattacharyya, ‘Interwar housing speculation’, 469-70; A. Vanaik. ‘Representing commodified space: maps, 
leases, auctions and “narrations” of property in Delhi, c. 1900-47’, Institute of Historical Research (2014) DOI: 
10.1111/1468-22081. The Indian trusts were modelled on urban development projects in Britain such as the 
Glasgow Improvement Trust: see S. Hazareesingh, ‘Colonial modernism and the flawed paradigms of urban 
renewal: uneven development in Bombay, 1900-25’, Urban History, 28 (2001), 235-55. 
25 Kidambi, Indian Metropolis, 88; Hazareesingh, ‘Colonial modernism’, 241. 
26 Bhattacharyya, ‘Interwar housing speculation’, 469-70. 
27 For use of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 elsewhere, see D. A. Johnson, ‘Land acquisition, landlessness, 
and the building of New Delhi’, Radical History Review, 108 (2010), 91-116.  
28 Hartnell Anderson, Manual, 38. 
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became quickly clear that officers’ attempts to determine land values proved elusive at best. 
Any idea that there was an objective value to land was defeated. Let us now turn to 
considering rising land values in the early years of the Improvement Trust. 
 
The Improvement Trust and rising land values 
The Trust’s board had fourteen members comprised of colonial officials and local elites, 
many of whom were landowners themselves.29 Its development plans were viewed with some 
suspicion by the existing administrative and commercial bodies in the city. There was 
particular tension between the Trust and the municipal corporation when the prominent 
businessmen and landlords of the city who made up the corporation questioned the financial 
wisdom of its schemes.30 Nevertheless, the Trust began its operations in 1898. It immediately 
embarked on large-scale demolition of housing in the city’s most congested areas, displacing 
tens of thousands of the urban poor with inadequate provision for rehousing.31 The local 
press, aghast at the housing situation, roundly criticised the Trust, accusing it of favouring 
rich areas over poor. As one item in the Gujarati noted, the ‘main concern of the Trust would 
be the improvement of the insanitary areas of the city and the provision of well-lighted and 
well-ventilated residential quarters for the poor inhabitants’. Yet the Trustees ‘think it 
necessary to construct a fine marine drive along Kennedy Seaface….They were never 
appointed to look to the…wants of fashionable folks before attending to questions of vital 
importance to the population at large’.32  
The pressure on housing led to rapidly increasing rents. Hazareesingh notes that 
between 1898 and 1918 rents increased between 100 and 200 per cent.33 A report 
commissioned on the development of Bombay published in 1914 gathered opinion from 
officials, engineers and businessmen in the city who suggested the rising rents and land prices 
                                                            
29 These included three ex-officio trustees; seven elected trustees of whom four were elected by the Municipal 
Corporation, one by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, one by the Port Trust of Bombay and one by the 
Bombay Millowners Association; and three trustees and a chairman nominated by the Government of Bombay. 
See Rao, House But No Garden, notes to chapter 1, note 8, 248.  
30 Hazareesingh, Colonial City, 31-2, Kidambi, Indian Metropolis, 84-5.  
31 On the housing crisis created by the Trust, see P. Kidambi, ‘Housing the poor in a colonial city: the Bombay 
Improvement Trust, 1898-1918’, Studies in History, 25 (2001), 57-79.  
32 Native Newspaper Reports for the Bombay Presidency (NNRBP), Gujarati, 28 Apr. 1901. 
33 Hazareesingh, Colonial City, 43-4. 
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were closely connected to the activities of the Trust.34 In his statement to the committee, 
Abdul Hoosein Adamji Peerbhoy, a Bohra businessman, wrote that the Trust’s demolition of 
housing had displaced large numbers of the city’s poor and increased congestion and 
insanitary conditions in other areas. Significantly, he noted, fewer houses ‘had helped to 
increase rents and consequently the value of landed properties in Bombay’.35 Many also 
believed that the Trust’s new houses, built with the more expensive materials of cement and 
steel, were meant for a richer class of tenant.36 However, the problem was as much that 
spiralling rents encouraged speculation, a concern for officials as well as a wider public. The 
collapse of a new building in Crawford Market in 1903 drew angry criticism from those who 
believed that because of high land prices, a ‘class of capitalists’ had sprung up in the city, 
‘building cheap houses’ and making ‘big fortunes with reckless disregard for the safety of the 
tenants who may live therein’.37 H.P. Mody, the Special Officer to the Committee for the 
Development of Bombay, warned that the Trust’s acquisitions had ‘drawn into the market 
speculative builders’.38 He contended that while the areas to the north of the city should be 
developed, ‘private owners of land should not be allowed to buy up large areas and sit tight 
over them for years waiting for a rise in the market’. Speculation should be carefully 
managed through ‘well-considered enactments governing the acquisition and assessment of 
land in the future’.39  
Yet the Trust itself was criticised for engaging in ‘speculative transactions’.40 The 
Ratepayers’ Association of Bombay argued that it was profiting from its own activities: it 
acquired properties as part of a scheme which it would then sell at enormous profit. A piece 
in the Jam-e-Jamshed noted that the Trust acquired plots ‘in some of the best portions of 
town’ and ‘in a money-making craze’ sold them off without consideration for building 
purposes.41 The Trust also drew censure from property owners who complained bitterly that 
it had been ruinous for them. Vasantrao Anandrao Dabholkar, in his statement to the 
                                                            
34 Bombay Development Committee (Hill) Report, 1913-14, IOR, BL. 
35 Hill Report, submission from Abdul Hoosein Adamji Peerbhoy, 22 Nov. 1913, p. 86. 
36 ‘Rents in Bombay’, Times of India, 16 Aug. 1907. This is a point the chairman of the Trust himself attested 
to: Hazareesingh, Colonial City, 44. 
37 NNRBP, Bombay Samachar, 2 June 1903. 
38 Ibid., H.P. Mody to the Special Officer to the Committee for the Development of Bombay, Hill Report, 125-7. 
39 Ibid., 127. 
40 NNRBP, Bombay Samachar, 21 Aug. 1902.  
41 NNRBP, Jam-e-Jamshed, 23 Jan. 1903. 
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development committee, observed that landlords had ‘suffered heavy losses’. The Trust, he 
complained, would ‘notify’ properties and then sit for years without actually acquiring them, 
a move which prevented landlords from selling to private owners.42 In urban India, there was 
a tendency for landlords deliberately to keep their rents low so as to avoid municipal rates. 
When the Trust began its acquisitions in Bombay, however, many quickly raised their rents 
so in the event of the land being notified they would get close to its actual value.43 It was, 
Dabholkar noted, the Trust’s ‘acquisition procedure’ that was the problem. In the north of the 
island, it demolished existing buildings, turning the land into a vacant space to be laid out in 
plots with roads running in between. It had paid very little for the land acquired for Dadar, 
Matunga and Sion, and later ‘succeeded in selling [a plot] at a value twice as high as the price 
awarded’.44 The notification and acquisition of land had created great uncertainty, he 
claimed. The Trust had, the Bombay Samachar held, tended to ‘unsettle the value of house 
property in the city’.45   
 
Land Acquisition and the ‘Market Value’ of Land 
Tenants and owners whose land had been notified were to be compensated its ‘market value’ 
as outlined in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. The act outlined the principles 
for compensation according to English law. In calculating the award, officers were to take 
into account a number of principles: the loss or injury sustained by the interested person 
deprived of their land, the value to the owner and the ‘potential value’ of the land. The ‘value 
to the owner’ was different than the ‘market value’, and was defined as ‘the value which a 
willing seller may expect from a willing purchaser in the open market’.46 The ‘potential 
value’ calculated the value of what the land would be worth if put to a particular purpose 
which enhanced its value. If the potential value was properly determined, this could be its 
market value. 
                                                            
42 Hill Report, submission from Vasantrao Dabholkar, 28 Nov. 1913, 106-8. 
43 Ibid. See too: Kidambi, Indian Metropolis, 86-7. 
44 Hill Report, Dabholkar submission, 108. 
45 NNRBP Bombay Samachar, 30 June 1903. 
46 M.N. Gupta, Land acquisition acts and principles of valuation (Calcutta, 1939), 126-9.  
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 The definition of ‘market value’ was vague, and was taken to mean ‘the price a 
willing buyer would give to a willing seller’.47 It could be determined by considering the 
price of similar property in the neighbourhood at the time of notification or by its potential 
future disposition if laid out in the most lucrative manner.48 Actual sales of similar lands in 
the locality were deemed to give ‘an index of the proper market value’ but did not, by 
themselves, stand in for it.49 Further to complicate matters, the Indian courts also recognised 
three other methods of determining market value: 1) the price paid in bona fide transactions, 
that is, in an unforced sale; 2) capitalization, a calculation that involved a projection usually 
over 25 years, which took into account an estimation of depreciation to the land and 
buildings, a deduction for the costs for developing the land, the ground rent and the projected 
interest from the rent; and 3) expert opinion, the opinion of valuators and experts who used 
both recent sales and capitalisation of land revenue to calculate the land’s value.50 In 
England, valuers tended to favour capitalisation as a more ‘scientific’ method.51 In India, 
courts were inclined to give preference to sales of the land itself or of similar lands in the 
neighbourhood, as in many parts of Bombay, land was being laid out for the first time. In 
either context, sales had to be bona fide or else they would not give a proper market value. It 
was the basis on which market value was to be determined that arguments in court turned. 
 In the case of the Cama brothers, the land that had been acquired was for a goods 
depot in the industrial area in the Indian town. The collector’s award had been calculated on 
the ‘net rental’ method. This involved calculating the net income through rent of the acquired 
land and buildings, multiplying it by a certain number of years to give a figure that was 
supposed to reflect the current value of the land.52 The Cama brothers, however, had also had 
their land valued by the ‘hypothetical’ scheme and the valuation was almost one and a half 
times that of the collector. The hypothetical method held that if a parcel of land could be 
developed for more profitable future use, this may enhance its value and must be considered 
as a factor. So, it calculated the value of a parcel of land by providing figures of residential or 
                                                            
47 Ibid., 132.  
48 Ibid., 132-3. 
49 Ibid., 135.  
50 Ibid., 135-6. 
51 Ibid., 136. 
52 On the rental method and other methods of valuing land, see MSA, Public Works Department (PWD), file 
‘Lands: Bombay’, vol. 333, compilation no. 50 of 1904 (1904-9); Kidambi, Indian Metropolis, 86-7. 
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commercial buildings that might be built upon it. The number of units, the rent they may 
yield and the projected future demand were all taken into account. The net annual return was 
then capitalised. The value was hypothetical as it was based on a projected calculation of how 
the land might be developed and what rental income it may yield subsequently.53 
The difference in the two approaches lay in the ambiguity around what constituted 
land value. The Land Acquisition Act prescribed that land had an intrinsic value. The Camas’ 
position, also guided by the Act, maintained that the ‘potential value of the land must be 
taken into consideration’.54 Compensation, the Camas argued, should be based ‘not [on] what 
the property is actually worth, but what a Bombay purchaser in a Bombay market would 
think it is worth and would give for it’. The land in question was in the centre of the mill 
district and had ‘an inherent value for every possible purpose connected with mills’. It was, 
they insisted, ‘extremely desirable from an investor’s point of view’.55 They noted that 
between 1902 and 1904, the value of land had risen steeply in the mill district. The number of 
people working in the mills was growing quickly and demand for land was great. Any doubts 
about projecting a profit should be allayed. Counsel thus argued that the proper method of 
valuation would be through the hypothetical scheme, confirmed by sales in the 
neighbourhood.56 Valuing land in Bombay, however, was complicated by the inconsistency 
of tenures. As a result, Rao argues, the land market worked on a ‘principle of proximity and 
adjacency’ – land was valued in line with other plots in the vicinity.57 In the Cama case, the 
counsel for the government maintained that the hypothetical scheme had been misapplied. It 
was normally used to value land in a crowded locality meant for buildings.58 Yet, the Camas’ 
land was meant only for mills and thus ‘the value of the land would depend upon the 
                                                            
53 The hypothetical method is also explained in 10 Bom LR (1908) 907, Appeal from Original Civil, 
Government of Bombay v. Merwanji Muncherji Cama. For other disputes on the valuation of land acquired by 
the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in the first decade of the twentieth century, see: Indian Law Reports (I.L.R.) 33 
Bom 483 (1909) The Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bombay, v. Jalbhoy Ardeshir Sett and 
Another; I.L.R. 34 Bom 618 (1910), In the matter of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the Government of 
Bombay, v. Esufali Salebhai; I.L.R. 34 Bom 486 (1910) In the matter of Land Acquisition Act. In the matter of 
Government and Sukhanand Gurumukhrai and Another. 
54 9 Bom LR (1907) 1232, In re: Government of Bombay and Merwanji Cama, 1236.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid., 1237. 
57 Rao, House But No Garden, 35.  
58 I.L.R. 29 Bom (1905) 565, Anandrav Vinayak v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Another 
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condition of the mill-industry’.59 At the time of notification the mill industry was at a low 
ebb, with unsecured ground rents on land with no buildings. Thus, there were no comparable 
buildings against which the sale could be checked.  
There were other issues: the advocate general pointed out that the hypothetical value 
projected the volume of demand for the chawls that were planned to be built on the land. 
How was that to be verified? If the tenements to house those working in the mills were 
actually erected and occupied, then the collector would not dispute the calculation. But it was 
not clear that demand from such skilled workers existed.60 Moreover, demand could not be 
determined by offers of sales, for while sales had a ‘probative value’, they may not give a 
proper market value.61 A sale may be forced, or without proper enquiry by valuers, it may be 
to someone unreliable; it may not thus be ‘genuine’.62 Hypothetical development thus 
presumed a level of demand that may not be there.63 In addition, there was the problem that 
offers of sales could simply spiral out of control, artificially inflating prices. The Trust 
baulked at the hypothetical valuation because it tended to higher amounts and had cost them 
dear.64 It also resisted equating land value with what people were willing to pay as it fuelled 
speculation. The judge in the Cama case deemed the rental method a more reliable 
determinant of market value as it reflected what the land would bring at that time. A 
hypothetical calculation, he said, had negligible basis in actual circumstances and the Camas 
had ‘over built in imagination’.65 However, he noted, if a buyer is looking to sell on, the 
value of the property does not come from rents but from ‘the future market price which he 
speculates on obtaining’.66 A buyer will not buy the property if he does not believe he can 
recoup the costs of the transaction on resale and get more than the market price at the time of 
purchase. 
It was the tension between these two approaches – the one asserting an objective 
value for land and the other insisting that value shifted with demand and circumstance – that 
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shaped the Trust’s approach to assessing market value. Yet, herein lay the problem, for how 
was market value to be objectively assessed? The Camas, wanting the best outcome for 
themselves, maintained that the recent history of rising prices in the area reflected the current 
value for chawls. The collector’s offer was not accurate, their counsel alleged, for people 
were offering double the amount even on inferior plots removed from the main road. When 
buyers were willing to offer higher prices in the vicinity of the claimants’ land, an earlier 
purchase price could not be taken as reflecting the market value. Counsel argued that land 
purchased at lower prices should be seen ‘as an index rather of the minimum price at which 
land could be bought in that neighbourhood before the market had realised the potentialities 
of development’.67 Thus the price at which land was sold did not necessarily indicate its true 
potential. Speculation drove value upwards and should figure in the calculation. Despite his 
reservations, the judge accepted the hypothetical scheme, saying that ‘a hypothetical scheme 
can be open to no reproach… [if] based on ascertained facts’.68 The case went through the 
courts of appeal and reached the Privy Council, which ultimately upheld the judgement 
supporting the use of hypothetical valuation.  
When tested in subsequent cases, however, the hypothetical scheme was found 
wanting. One case was that of Dhanjibhoy Bomanji in relation to the acquisition of two plots 
of land in 1904 in Mazagon, in the eastern part of the city near the P&O dockyard. This was a 
mixed area. There was a koli (fishing community) settlement and a native Portuguese and 
Hindu community. The land was to be acquired by the Bombay Port Trust for the 
construction of a railway.69 Bomanji worked for the British India Company of the British 
Indian Dock, which were aiming to extend their land holdings westwards into the city. As 
their agent, he sought to acquire land and a number of properties in the area. The land would 
be used to house the displaced kolis and Bomanji anticipated it would increase in value 
because of the acquisition by the British India Company.70 The Collector’s award used the 
hypothetical scheme and was based on the judgement that this was a ‘dying locality’, a 
suggestion that Bomanji challenged. Justice Macleod in the Bomanji case was scathing in his 
rejection of the scheme: ‘an hypothetical building scheme ….depends on imaginary buildings 
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fetching imaginary rents’.71 The method originated, he believed, when experts had to justify 
the high value they placed on land where there was no direct evidence for such values. The 
gross rents expected from buildings yet to be constructed were supposed to yield the market 
value. The problem was that, in determining rent, the valuer necessarily began with a 
‘preconceived opinion of the value of the land’.72 The hypothetical scheme’s calculations 
were thus moulded around a value that had already been fixed. The judge determined that it 
was wrong ‘to go further into the future and estimate the exact use to which the land may be 
put and the profit to be derived therefrom’, for that calculation would be ‘purely hypothetical 
and cannot possibly be based on ascertained facts’.73  
As the hypothetical scheme came under scrutiny and was largely rejected for heavily 
inflated valuations and its tendency to speculation, the courts turned more regularly to other 
methods like comparative sales in the neighbourhood and a method known as ‘plotting’. The 
latter was used for newly laid out areas in the suburbs where there was very little by way of 
comparable land to value it.74 Essentially, a potential purchaser would make an offer on a 
piece of land based on calculations that involved plotting the land out into building sites. A 
developer would calculate the costs of developing the land. In addition to the construction of 
buildings, this included filling, clearing and draining the land and creating infrastructure such 
as lighting and roads. Surveyors estimated what the plots would fetch once developed and 
after the costs were subtracted. The value of the separate plots when added together was 
supposed to yield the market value of the total area. A rather neat method, as Rao writes, this 
allowed the developer to ‘demand retail prices for what amounted to a wholesale 
transaction’.75 Judges were also wary of plotting schemes, arguing that land had one value 
and land with buildings, another. Moreover, one judge warned: ‘too much importance must 
not be attached to evidence of offers’. He cautioned against professional speculators: these 
were ‘irresponsible brokers’ who made offers ‘on behalf of undisclosed principals’ or for 
themselves with no principal behind them. These offers were ‘useless’.76  
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By 1908 the hypothetical scheme was considered by the courts to be too speculative, 
over-estimating the market value of land. Yet neither offers nor plotting were viewed as an 
accurate gauge of land values. Significantly, judges made clear that valuation was not to be 
led by trends in the market. In a case of a piece of land belonging to Karim Tar Mahomed in 
Mazagon, notified in 1904, the judge observed that the valuation could not be based on what 
the property was producing at the time, nor had there been any recent sales of the land to go 
by.77 Rather, the market value had to be determined ‘by sales of similar land in the 
neighbourhood’.78 The court could also be guided by the opinions of surveyors, although the 
judge determined that their reports must ‘be based on facts and not on hypothesis’.79 He 
maintained that it would not be difficult to arrive at approximate values for land on the 
Mazagon Road as six neighbouring plots had been bought and sold at around the same time 
as the plot under notification. The six plots went at auction for increasingly higher prices 
between 1902 and 1907: Rs 21 per square yard in 1902, Rs 37 per square yard in 1906, Rs 47 
per square yard in 1907. The judge noted that ‘there was nothing to show that land value had 
increased between 1902 and 1904’ but pointed to the boom in the mill industry when ‘from 
early in 1905 prices of land began to rise…until…by the end of the year almost fabulous 
prices were being given’.80 He continued that sales after the notification in 1904 should be 
disregarded, ‘when it is proved that values have been affected one way or the other by 
circumstances which have arisen after that date’.81 The fluctuations of the market, then, must 
be kept out of the equation.  
In the years before the War, officials of the Trust sought to compensate those from 
whom it had acquired land for purposes of urban development its ‘market value’. Judges 
were wary of incorporating the rising land prices into their calculations, seeing them as 
inflated and speculative. The First World War saw a land boom across cities in British India, 
however, which had a significant impact on the valuation methods of the Trust and 
subsequent judgments in the High Court.  
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Land speculation after the War 
The end of the War brought significant economic change. Indian merchants and industrialists 
had prospered through the years of the First World War, with the immediate post-war period 
witnessing further growth in trade and industry.82 In urban India, trading communities 
invested their gains in commodities and machinery as well as in land. Ritu Birla and Debjani 
Bhattacharyya suggest that the expansion of the Indian economy in the early twentieth 
century saw a shift on the part of the colonial government to legitimize speculative 
investment as important for a modernizing economy. This seems to reflect broader changes in 
approaches to the economy in this period. Timothy Mitchell, writing on Egypt, argues that 
around the 1930s, there was a shift in how people – government officials, academics, policy 
makers – understood the economy. In a departure from earlier decades, he maintains that they 
began to refer to ‘the economy’ with a definite article, seeing it as an autonomous entity with 
universal principles. The economy now ‘denoted a distinct social sphere’, an object that could 
be studied scientifically.83  
 The end of the War also marked a significant change to the structures of colonial 
governance. In 1918 the government of India introduced the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, a 
constitutional measure that devolved the day-to-day responsibility for governing to the 
provinces. Thus, irrigation and public works, education, land revenue administration, excise, 
industrial matters, police and such were now run from the provincial governments, and, 
significantly, were largely in Indian hands. This meant that the ‘colonial state’ looked quite 
different in 1920 than it had in 1905: there was often divergence in policy approaches 
between departments as well as differences of opinion with the centre of power in Delhi.84 In 
addition, the Bombay Improvement Trust having been widely criticised for failing to improve 
the housing and sanitation conditions – indeed many argued it had exacerbated the problems 
of homelessness and overcrowding – was replaced in 1920 by the Bombay Development 
Directorate (BDD) which was to oversee the course of urban development in the city. The 
criticisms had come largely from the prominent landowners and businessmen of the city, 
some of whom comprised the municipal corporation and whose speculative ambitions the 
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Trust’s valuations had presumably thwarted. The Trust continued in a minor role until 1933 
when it was absorbed into the municipal corporation.85  
In urban India the post-war economic boom brought new investment in Bombay’s 
land market. Many investors became landlords and the high rents and squalid living 
conditions remained despite government attempts to introduce rent regulation in 1918.86 The 
Registration Department’s annual report for 1918 already noted an extraordinary rise in the 
value of property in the city. Land registrations in 1919 showed a 64 percent increase in the 
aggregate value of transactions over the previous three years.87 The rise in land prices seemed 
to take many by surprise – people called it a ‘frenzy’, a ‘madness’ – and drew much angry 
commentary. The Trust received some of that ire, but most was reserved for those who had 
‘amassed wealth in some trade or speculation’. They were, one P. B. Joshi wrote, ‘speculators 
in landed properties’ from the mercantile classes of the city, ‘the Bohras, Bhatias, Marwardis 
and Banias’. They bought properties at ‘fabulous prices’ and drove rents up in order to recoup 
the high prices they had paid for the land. Many had bought plots from the Trust and then 
sold them on at a profit to people who would sell them on again.88 Significantly, escalating 
land values attracted a wider net of investors than ever before. As one writer noted, ‘the mad 
speculation in landed properties…had been indulged in not only by the rich, but also by those 
who were not rich’.89  
The intensity of speculation had put real pressure on housing and people complained 
about greedy landlords who forced middle class families to squeeze into tiny spaces which 
bred squalor and immorality as they increased their income.90 Many called on the 
government to make ‘profiteering’ in land illegal. One letter in 1919 explained that the war 
had given speculators ‘a powerful driving force. Tons of money has been amassed by 
profiteers who do not know what to do with their ill-gotten gains’. They put it into housing 
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and land and ‘pay fabulous sums for anything of the kind thrown their way…. Plots leased or 
sold by the Improvement Trust have been changing hands time after time, for prices 
bordering on the insane’.91 The Rent Enquiry Committee’s report of 1939 confirmed this 
wider public concern. It commented that the increase in property values through the war was 
due to a shortage of housing, but equally to the ‘speculative tendency…that is observable in 
the property market’.92 One witness from the Bombay Tenants Central Committee remarked 
that capital investment ‘in landed property was a business proposition today for people with 
money had no other alternative’. The problem was that ‘possession of landed property had 
become the monopoly of only a few individuals’. 93 ‘Frequent changes in… [property] 
ownership’, the report continued, ‘often result in an attempt to raise rents’.94 Thus property 
speculators could not be relied upon to lower their rents, for ‘capital that is attracted to 
building industry seeks increasing profits’.95  
The post-war land boom had a significant impact on the Trust and its practices of 
compensation. In a period of speculation where people were willing to offer far more than a 
piece of land was currently worth, how was its real value to be ascertained? How far should 
the Trust follow the trends of the market in its awards? A case concerning compensation for a 
piece of land notified in 1919, at the height of the boom, provides some insight into these 
questions. The land was part of the Trust’s scheme 53, to develop Worli, a suburb in the 
north, with reinforced concrete chawls. The property was acquired in 1920 for about Rs15 per 
square yard. On appeal, the Tribunal calculated its value at 19 percent above the award, at 
just over Rs.18 per square yard. How did they justify such a rise? The Trust’s annual report 
for 1921 commented that, given the period of speculation, 
the increase allowed by the Tribunal cannot be deemed to be excessive….When the 
state of the market is uncertain, owing more to speculative rise, than to a genuine 
demand, it is difficult to estimate values that can be sustained in courts of law with 
                                                            
91 Ibid. 
92 Report of the Rent Enquiry Committee (Bombay, 1939), vol. I, 31. 
93 Ibid., Oral Evidence, vol. III, 9-10.  
94 Ibid., vol. I, 31. 
95 Ibid., 34-8. 
20 
 
any degree of certainty – more so when the speculative element is such as cannot 
altogether be excluded from a natural rise due to supply and demand.96  
This acknowledgement that speculation should be incorporated into the compensation awards 
quickly became common practice. Citing a judgement made in 1920, the same report noted 
that calculations using the plotting scheme made ‘no provision…for the original purchaser’s 
profit at the time when he gets back this money. Supposing…he gets nothing for his troubles 
and for the risk that would be incurred’, why would anyone enter the market on these 
conditions? Thus, the report stated, ‘it is necessary to consider that a purchaser will expect to 
realise a larger profit on his original investment than the novel rate of interest so that…he will 
allow… an ample margin for his own profit’.97  
The post-war land boom was over quickly and land values fell away steeply. The 
Registration Department recorded a declining number of deeds registered for immoveable 
property in Bombay after 1920.98 It attributed the large decrease in registrations to a ‘reaction 
following a period of abnormal speculative activity’ and to ‘continued decline…in the trade 
and profits available for investment in land’. Also important was ‘the heavy fall in the value 
of land in the neighbourhood of Bombay and other large cities. Prospective buyers will not 
buy on a falling market.’99 However, even as the report for 1924 noted that ‘the reaction 
following the heavy speculative investment in properties is exhausted and normal conditions 
promise to be established’, Bombay’s land values remained depressed: ‘the value of 
immovable properties…in Bombay has declined by 25.5 percent’.100 A number of cases after 
1920 considered precisely the question of how to calculate land values as they fluctuated, and 
how far speculative activity should be incorporated into such calculations.  
In a case in 1923, for example, the government of Bombay had identified two pieces 
of land for compulsory acquisition in the suburb of Dadar.101 The claimant, Merwan 
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Moondigar Aga, had bought the two plots in 1912 for Rs 25,300 at Rs 4-4-0 per square 
yard.102 In 1919, he had an offer to sell at Rs 30 and another in 1920, Rs 42 per square yard. 
In light of the offers, the officer maintained that they were bona fide, but still only offers: ‘by 
themselves they do not furnish the value of a finished transaction’.103 Instead, he was guided 
by sales in the neighbourhood, with the resultant valuation of Rs 18 per square yard for one 
plot and Rs 25 per square yard for the other. The judge, determined to go by neighbouring 
sales rather than offers, looked to a recent sale directly across from the land in question. 
There, the land had been sold at the height of the boom in 1920 at Rs 33 per square yard and 
the question was whether that could serve as a guide price for Merwan Aga’s plot of land. 
The buyer, one Jamnadas, admitted to buying the land ‘in the hope of reselling at a profit’, 
although, unfortunately for him, the profit never came.104 The government’s counsel 
contended that the sale was either a sham or of such a speculative nature that it should be 
ignored.  However, the judge considered that ‘a parcel of land…bought by a speculator in 
land with the object of re-selling it at a profit is no ground for disregarding the sale in 
compensation cases’.105 The previous owners had bought the land with this intention, as did 
Jamnadas, who had bought it from them. Thus, ‘both vendors and purchasers were 
speculators’. But, the judge maintained, this was ‘no ground for ignoring the transaction 
altogether’. Simply because the sale was speculative did not discredit it.  
Counsel for the government of Bombay argued that the wave of speculation in 1919-
1920 had resulted in spiralling land prices that could not be a gauge to calculating the ‘market 
value’ of land, which should be understood as its ‘intrinsic value’. The claimant’s counsel 
disputed this, arguing that ‘market value’ was something other than intrinsic value. Faced 
with this stalemate, the judge had to decide how far ‘the element of rise in the price of land 
occasioned by speculation is to be taken into consideration’.106 Section 23 in the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894 stipulated that ‘market value’ meant ‘the value which a parcel of 
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land would realise if sold in the market’.107 The seller must be willing and the purchaser must 
be prudent, that is, someone who makes the necessary inquiries as to the value of the land. 
Someone who carelessly makes an uninformed offer ‘affords no test of market value’. The 
‘essential feature of market value’, the judge determined, is ‘the value that could be realised 
on a sale in the open market’. Whether ‘dull or brisk’ the market ‘cannot be excluded from 
consideration’ as ‘there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act which requires the Court to do 
so’.108 On the contrary, he noted, ‘you cannot possibly ascertain the market value of a piece 
of land at a given time if you exclude from consideration the state of the market at that 
time…. The high rates prevailing in 1919 and the first half of 1920 cannot be ignored’.109 
 
Conclusion 
In the first decade of the Bombay Improvement Trust’s activities, the intricate mathematical 
calculations brought to bear in the compensation awards of acquired land reflected an idea 
that the value of land could be calculated accurately and that it had an intrinsic value. In the 
early years of the Trust’s operations, the special officers of the government overseeing land 
acquisition maintained that their methods should not encourage speculation. The hypothetical 
scheme was rejected for projecting unsubstantiated values, and plotting or offers of sales 
appeared as whimsical and subject to exploitation. Yet as the Trust’s activities brought a 
swathe of new investors into the market, the idea that value could be decided objectively was 
difficult to sustain. The Trust wanted to encourage private investment but found it hard to 
manage what seemed to be an accelerating market in land. They wanted investors to buy the 
land north of the city, but not hoard it waiting for prices to go up. Criticisms of the Trust 
came from the wealthy landowners of the city and particularly from the Bombay municipal 
corporation who accused it of failing to solve the problems of urban development and of 
mismanaging and even exploiting the land market. 
The period after the First World War brought a moment of great land speculation and 
a shift in the importance given to the intrinsic value of land.110 Judges deciding cases in 
compensation who had earlier argued strongly against incorporating rising land values into 
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their calculations, increasingly argued that the speculative trend in the land market was 
central to the motivations of buyers and sellers and must now be figured in. Yet, as awards 
could be raised, so they could also be reduced when it was deemed the market had cooled off, 
which it did, in quite dramatic fashion after 1920: people reported properties that had earlier 
sold for Rs. 300,000 now only fetching Rs 50,000. The problems with land speculation 
continued: the professional speculators’ profits from new developments, the high rents of 
landlords and the hoarding of land. The Trust and its officers were also perceived to have 
benefited from the rising price of land and were themselves accused of ‘profiteering’ from the 
auction of leases.111  
The slump after 1920 did not prompt a return to the pre-war practices of valuation. 
Officials of the Trust now accepted as a matter of course that calculations should reflect the 
shifts in the market as investors would expect an enhanced return on an investment. Those 
who had profited through the War years sought to realise their material ambitions, in part, at 
least, through reinvesting those profits in urban property. With the Trust weakened, these 
ambitions dovetailed with broader shifts in approaches to the economy: the idea that the 
economy of which the land market was a part, was an entity that officials now saw as 
working independently of them. Moreover, the investor-speculators had also to accept risk as 
par for the course. Where between 1922 and 1925 people had been reluctant to acquire land, 
by 1926 they were, once again, ‘feeling the temperature of the market’.112 With large 
amounts of land being made available, people were asking ‘what the state of the land market 
is, and what its future promises to be’. As one correspondent observed: ‘if a fair rate of 
interest on capital is shown, the public seems inclined once more to look favourably upon 
property as an investment’.113 The Trust’s calculations were often for land that had only 
recently come into being and for which valuation was a creative fiction. In the early years, it 
was important for its officials to maintain this fiction through the rationality of the law and 
the science of mathematical projection. The attempt at certainty in these valuations faded 
after the mid-1920s. 
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Scholars of urban environments have posited a close connection between urban 
expansion and capitalist speculation in land. In the case of Bombay, historians have argued 
that in the early twentieth century the land acquisition of the Bombay Improvement Trust was 
a key factor in rising land values. Yet what precisely its role was in shaping the land market 
and speculation has been unclear. Its systematising of tenures and laying out of plots certainly 
drew new investors in land which pushed forward a new phase in Bombay’s capitalist land 
market. This article has suggested that what tied land acquisition by the Trust and private 
investment in land together was the role of court rulings on the methods by which the plots of 
land were valued. In a study of disputes around compensation for acquired land, it shows how 
the platform this created enabled people to forward competing claims around land values. 
The Trust’s position was ambiguous: in leasing out plots it sought to manage the land market 
in an objective fashion. However, its ability to do so was limited both by such disputes 
around the ‘market value’ of any plot and by the growing idea that their awards must 
ultimately be shaped by the speculative trends of the market itself.    
 
 
